Mutual Relationship between the Islamic Republic of Iran’s Political Identity and the Enemy US

Abstract

Since the victory of the Islamic Revolution and the ensuing hostage taking at the US embassy in Tehran in 1979, the "other" – the enemy US – has turned into one of the most significant demonstrative and stabilizing elements of the political identity of the Islamic Republic of Iran. This article, focused on the role of political identity, seeks to explain why four decades after the Islamic Revolution, the Islamic Republic of Iran still sticks to the policy of no-ties with the United States of America, resists US-centered structural pressure and rejects any reconciliation with the US. To answer this question, we resort to the views of political realists. Political realists refer to the distinction between a friend and a foe as the essence and core of politics. However, they also note groups and divisions’ naturally strong desire for political identity instead of structure and inclination for power. They also lay emphasis on the necessity of keeping distance from enemies for survival and accomplishment to objectives.

Keywords: Political Realism, Political Identity, Securitization, Islamic Revolution Discourse, Enemy.

 

1. Introduction

Nearly four decades have passed since the Islamic Republic of Iran and the US severed their diplomatic ties. Over this time, US officials have on many occasions voiced their readiness – their real intentions aside – to hold talks and interact with Iran. Nonetheless, the Islamic Republic of Iran has reacted with pessimism to such stances and rejected any direct talks between Tehran and Washington, DC, citing past failed experience, Americans’ breach of promises, and the intensification of pressure on Iran. The question this article seeks to answer is why Islamic Republic officials view the US as their leading enemy and refuse to redefine and re-establish ties with the US government despite reasoning by Iranian elite and political factions during specific periods for the resumption of ties. Still more significant would be to find out a relationship between resistance to the resumption of ties with the US and the Islamic Republic’s national security.

The main objective pursued in this article would be to analyze the role of political identity in the inception and persistence of “Iran-US hostility”. The thoughts and views of a wide spectrum of international relations and security theorists will be cited throughout the article to provide the best possible analysis of the Iran-US animosity.

Section 1 of the article, which is about the concept of political identity, reviews Carl Schmitt’s views. Section 2 explains notions such as the security of ontology, the policy of securitization, and religious discourse from the viewpoint of constructivists and theorists.

Different sections of the article are automatically linked to one another. However, it should be noted that this interconnection does by no means imply longitudinal causality; rather, it results from the failure of thought or notion-based viewpoints to analyze the topic.

In the closing sections of the article, a causal analysis of the topic of this study is provided, which would differ from the way the article is arranged.

 

2. Conceptual and Theoretical Framework
   1. Political Identity

Identity and its role in shaping the actors’ interests and actions constitute a significant ontological element of constructivism (Price and Reus-Smit, 1998: 266-267). The shift from focusing on the distribution of capabilities – which is specifically highlighted in the dominant paradigm of international relations – to focusing on the role of identity in explaining and describing the behavior of governments represents a major pivot in the thoughts of constructivists (Kubalkova, 2001: 33). In constructivism, identity implies relatively identical perceptions based on one’s own role and expectations from others. Emphasizing the concept of intersubjectivity, constructivists maintain that actors achieve their interests and identity through participation in collective meanings. Every identity represents the social definition of an actor and is rooted in the theories developed collectively by the actors about themselves and others, which would consolidate the structure of a social world (Wendt, 1999: 238).

Normally, when there is a talk of identity in international relations, the first things crossing the minds of international relations experts is constructivism; however, it should be noted that constructivists were not the only group who have stressed out the concept of identity in international relations theories as various theorists and even traditional realists and neo-realists have implicitly spoken of this concept. This section focuses on the Carl Schmitt-backed classic realism, structural realism, and constructivism (Kelanic, 2008: 2) to discuss political identity and reviews the issue of “Iran-US enmity”.

Schmitt, favoring the realistic nature of political identity, bases his views of international relations on the assumption that humankind definitely needs a political identity[1].

In his The Concept of the Political, Schmitt maintains that all main concepts related to human life like the aspects of esthetics, moral and economic issues are based on conflicting pairs as well as theses and antitheses; like beauty versus ugliness, good versus bad, profit versus loss. To him, politics per se comprises friends and foes (Schmitt, 1996: 25-27). As said, Schmitt’s thoughts comprise elements from a variety of theoretic schools of thought and every theorist has interpreted the friend-foe couple based on his own interpretation.

For instance, in interpreting classic realism in Schmitt's thoughts, humankind’s ill intentions and inclination for power raise the risk of war and intensifies the classification based on friendship and enmity. Or in a neo-realistic interpretation of Schmitt's views, the concept of politics or distinguishing friends from foes results from a combination of anarchy and uncertainty in others' views, which would, in turn, raise the threat of war and make further distinctions between friends and foes (Kelanic, 2008: 6).

Schmitt, whose views about international relations reflect Mercer's view[2], holds that the friend-foe distinction is born out of a strong need for political identity and not the structure of power or inclination for it. He maintains that the very essence of politics is the distinction between friend and foe and the mechanism of its management (Schmitt, 1996: 26). Schmitt's departure point is collective differences. The political world is pluralist and not integrated. It comprises a variety of governments, religions, classes, and groups. As such, "other" is the enemy. To Schmitt, the reason behind the persistence of such a contrast stems from the fact that the natural differences between human beings would lead to billing "other" as the enemy. It becomes more interesting when another variable is included; human beings naturally tend to shape political groupings, which would be recognized only by their opponents as political foes. That is why groups fail to protect their friendly ties with all other groups at every time because they need an "other" (enemy) to have a meaningful identity.

The likelihood of friends turning into foes and vice versa further pushes to the bold belief in the fact that identity is an issue subject to redefinition. That is why Schmitt may be viewed as a proponent of constructivist views because, based on the presented interpretation, the natural conflict of interests is not instrumental in friendship or enmity; rather enemy is constructed and is subject to replacement. However, a major feature distinguishing Schmitt's view of political identity from the constructivists' viewpoint is that the Schmitt-favored concept of identity is required to be naturally enemy winning.

Therefore, identity constructivism in Schmitt's view is restricted[3] while in constructivism, identity might be constructed in a wide spectrum of models of friendship and enmity. Identity requires an enemy because first, it complies with the definition and friends and foes collectively give meaning to politics so that politics would no longer make any sense in the absence of either one. Second, enemies are ontologically preferred to friends. Friendship would make sense when there has already been enmity (Schmitt, 1996: 28). Therefore, according to Schmitt, a person who does not try to know his or her enemy will meet no other fate than demise (Schmitt, 1996: 68) because otherwise, he or she will no longer be prepared to endure physical violence by others in addition to dismantling his or her identity. For this reason, unlike the common perception that identity is known to be national, political identity is political by its nature.

In other words, in the former, "other" is not "one of us" while in the later, "other" is the same as "the enemy". That is on this basis that political identity is more concerned than national identity with concerns of survival (Khosravi, 2011: 10). The most significant reason for describing the political identity theorists as political realists may be hidden in such concerns.

Unlike Schmitt, Alexander Wendt emphasizes the significance of ideas. He maintains that by changing ideas one can pin hope on changes in the system. From such a standpoint, the behavior of governments reflects the non-material and constructed social structure comprising beliefs and norms. The governments refer to such a structure to perceive the world and their own special behaviors. Ideas can change. After that happens, governments' interests and subsequently their behavior will change. To Wendt, identities play the main role in affecting the interests and behaviors of governments (Wendt, 1992: 391). Holding an identity requires approval by others even though such approval is manifested in the form of an enemy.

Therefore, identity needs social identification. To Wendt, mutual approval between "self" and "other" would spur moving toward friendship, which would end in a collective identity. However, according to Schmitt, the identity of a group does not depend on accepting the "other" and "other's" imaginations are the least significant. What is of significance for Schmitt is that "self" would consider the "other" as a different being in order to be able to define "itself". Therefore, the difference between these two thoughts lies in the views of Wendt and Schmitt. Wendt's view on identity is inward looking and covers a higher number of governments. In other words, Wendt equalizes identity and encompassment (Kelanic, 2008: 26)

The point, which has been highlighted by Schmitt due to realism and we will use in Iran's religious and revolutionary discourse and the shaping of the current view of the US, is the role of the ruler or the ruling elite[4]. Schmitt argues that the first and foremost fearful enemy is the principle of the constitution of political affairs and second, despite representing people, governments give meaning to their freedom of action and political independence based on a radical interpretation of the meaning of representation. Schmitt believes that there are no autonomous and politically dynamic people who can impose any decision on political leaders. Only the ruler is able to express people's interests and demands (Huysmans, 2008: 169-170). A point to be considered is that although Schmitt considers the tendency for having an enemy and a political entity is natural, there is no specific and natural yardstick for enmity. In other words, the criteria are arbitrary (Kelanic, 2008: 19).

That is why he fails to provide any response to why political identity is defined based on enmity. From Schmitt's standpoint, interpreting Iran's view on the US in the context of political identity runs into trouble because in post-revolution Iran, fighting hegemony and injustice have grown into reliable and unchangeable criteria enshrined in the Constitution as the foundation of the Islamic Republic of Iran’s foreign policy. Therefore, unlike Schmitt's view or at least unlike Kelanic's interpretation of Schmitt, the constitutive elements of a political entity and subsequently winning an enemy are not arbitrary and accidental, but the features envisaged for the enemy may be arbitrary and changeable. When it comes to Iran's view on the US, identity-shaping elements and enemy features are born out of religious discourse.

Such discourse is based on criteria like fighting hegemony, which leads to its quest for examples to the US. With the turn of time, this enemy has been endowed with such a stature that it constitutes a major element in the ontological security of the Islamic Republic of Iran.

 

3. Political Identity and Ontological Security of the Islamic Republic of Iran

Inserting the concept of the tendency for political identity into Schmitt's realism would give a new dimension to the concept of security that is a pivotal issue in explaining the current status of the Iran-US ties. Based on their specific definition of security (physical security), realists maintain that governments evade finding a solution to the security dilemma. The security dilemma, which shapes the very core of the structural realism theory, signifies that under anarchic conditions a government's behaviors in favor of its own security may pose a threat to the security of others (Schweller, 1996: 119-120) and such a feeling would instigate arms race and war. Therefore, mistrust and uncertainty shape a security dilemma because it is very difficult to unveil the intentions of governments.

On the other hand, in a Schmitt-backed view on the concept of security, governments may not try to evade conflicts because even in thinking, having precarious ties may help safeguard security. What is meant by security here is not physical security, rather it is ontological security. Therefore, in such a thought, the security equation is totally inversed. Although uncertainty and mistrust form the main core of both dilemmas, the destination and the journey are totally different. In the former, the idea is to find a solution to maintain the status quo and reduce conflicts (although the inevitability of conflicts is acknowledged due to anarchy), while in the latter, the objective is based on conflicts and differences and the approach towards certainty and trust has an internal and cognitive nature, i.e. the circumstances where the enemy is known (Huysman, 1998: 240). Such security is also rooted in the tendency of human beings, groups, and governments to have a specific political identity vis-à-vis others. That is enshrined in Schmitt's thoughts.

Individuals need to feel secure in who they are as identities or selves. Some deep forms of uncertainty threaten this identity security. The reason is that an agency requires a stable cognitive environment. Where an actor has no idea what to expect, he or she cannot systematically relate ends to means, and it becomes unclear how to pursue his or her ends (Mitzen, 2006: 342). Since ends are constitutive of identity, in turn, deep uncertainty renders the actor’s identity insecure. Individuals are, therefore, motivated to create cognitive and behavioral certainty, which they do by establishing routines. When there is ontological insecurity, an individual’s energy is consumed to meet his or her immediate needs. He or she cannot relate ends systematically to means in the present, much less plan ahead. In short, he or she cannot realize a sense of agency (Mitzen, 2006: 345). The topic of this article is a case in point because there is no conflict of material interests (based on the realists' definition of interests) between the Iranian and US governments. It shows that if pursuing physical security is the only task assigned to governments, such compatibility and symmetry are not seen at least in the Islamic Republic's view on the US. In other words, re-establishing ties with the US and material calculations based on achievements and profits may also win the Islamic Republic of Iran’s big interests. Therefore, what is at stake is a more significant or more effective issue, which bars the Islamic Republic from reconsidering its view on the US and makes it behave so cautiously. The response to this question should be sought in the issue of uncertainty and disturbance of identity. Actors would need to mitigate uncertainty and reach confidence in order to make their environment predictable with a view on safeguarding their own security.

The mechanism to build basic trust is reutilization, which regularizes social life, making it, and the self, knowable. For constructivists, repetitive behaviors and reactions make the cognitive environment calm, assist in the actors' cognitive function and lay the ground for programming, which finally facilitates selection. In short, if it becomes certain who the other is, it will be easy to predict his or her behavior. If not, identity will be disturbed. The solution governments resort to in preserving their identity, mitigating uncertainty, and unveiling the enemy is the securitization of politics. However, the very important point highlighted pertains to the criteria of securitization and the role of such policy in boosting the political identity of a government. Finding the reasons behind the persistence of the Iran-US hostility is hidden in the cultural discourse and context.

In general, discourses constitute objects and subjects and every discourse is based on a large number of symbols. For instance, in the US foreign policy, there are many objects created based on discourse frameworks. The US foreign policy discourse has some signs of the framework of American political leaders' perceptive rules, which may take shape within an ideological framework. What neoconservatives view as terrorism and Islamic fundamentalism is the reflection of ideological rules. Therefore, the US managed after 9/11 to create signs of a discourse-based distinction between "self" and "others". Under such discourse, "self" refers to the US and "other" to Islamic radicalism (Moshirzadeh, 2007).

Discourse thus facilitates classification and separation, giving rise to political issues (Weldes, 1999: 217). Therefore, according to the principles of the dominant discourse, governments consider certain issues as a threat and move to securitize them. The general idea in discourse argumentation is that a dominant discourse gives shape to the agency (Foucault, 1981). Under such circumstances, individuals' statements reflect a large statement that dominates discourse which creates or limits the agency (Sjostedt, 2007: 238).

Now, we will briefly cite the statements of Iran's revolutionary and religious elite to show how nations give meaning to their policy within the framework of discourse and how the specific terms and symbols of a discourse result in practical measures and routines and stabilize the political identity of a specific unit vis-à-vis the enemy.

 

1. 1. Islamic Revolution Discourse and Constructing the US as an Enemy

To explore the roots of existing hostility between the Islamic Republic and the US, we have to study Iran's contemporary history[5]and the Pahlavi regime's submission to the US on the one hand and Imam Khomeini's thoughts and struggles on the other. Imam Khomeini's words and deeds in different periods of his struggles indicate that the revival of Islam would contain the influence of foreign domineering powers. In Imam Khomeini’s view, Western nations shared functional attitudes against Iran and the Muslim world, but given that the US political influence was stronger than other colonialist powers, Imam Khomeini pointed his broadside at the US as of June 1963. Imam Khomeini heaped scorn on the US for its meddlesome activities in Iran, saying combating the Shah was a tactic to prevent the US influence in Iran. That is why the US was described in the imam's words as the Great Satan.

In order to explain the US role and policy, Imam Khomeini coined specific terms, which had Islamic meanings on the one hand and had nationalistic dimensions and were mobilizing and humiliating on the other hand. Imam Khomeini made clear his objectives based on two assumptions: first, foreign elements were exercising control over Iran's political structure and were trying to institutionalize their own cultural, social and economic parameters in Iran; second, the more the Western dominance in Iran expands, the less the Islamic instructions will expand (Institute for Political Studies and Research, 2009). On this basis, Imam Khomeini underscored the necessity of fighting foreign dominance in order to stabilize the Islamic precepts and safeguard Islamic culture and norms. Therefore, the imam's objective in domestic political struggles was to protect the Islamic precepts. To that end, independence-seeking, anti-hegemony and freedom-seeking struggles provided an effective tool, which would facilitate the protection of the Islamic precepts on the one hand and elicit an all-encompassing and serous reaction against governments lacking broad-based domestic legitimacy on the other.

When the revolutionary struggle was at its zenith, the Americans – as the staunch supporter of the Shah regime – recommended the Shah to embrace constitutional government and opt for democracy and liberalization (Brzezinski, 1983: 233). Imam Khomeini, as the leader of the revolution, questioned the very foundation of the mordancy and its supporters and referred to countering the US as a top-priority political issue.

In the years following the Islamic Revolution and during the imposed war with Iraq, Imam Khomeini continued to describe the US as the "Great Satan" because he believed that "the US government, as the most powerful country in the world, spares no effort to devour the material reserves of the nations under its dominance. The US is the number one enemy of the poor in the world and will not refrain from any crime to expand its political, economic, cultural and military dominance over the world. It exploits innocent people in the world through its widespread propaganda organized by international Zionism. Assisted by its mysterious and treacherous stooges, it sucks the blood of defenseless people such that nobody else is allowed to live in this world. Iran, which has sought to cut ties with this Great Satan, is bogged down in these imposed wars today. The US has forced Iraq to bring us to our knees through economic embargo. Regrettably, most Asian nations are against us. Muslim nations must know that Iran is a country which is practically fighting the US and our martyrs, these youths and the Army troops and revolutionary guardsmen are defending Iran and Islam against the US" (Light Scene, 1990: 84).

What can be expressly seen in Imam Khomeini's words on the US is the role of terms and descriptions that have proven to be instrumental in shaping the revolutionary discourse and the political identity of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Nevertheless, as it was noted in the previous sections, the stability and the strength of this discourse depend on routines and practical procedures that would give meaning to political identity. Such practical measures, whether done by the US government or by the Iranian government, heightened conflict and enmity between the two governments. The peak of this enmity was seen in the takeover of the US embassy in Tehran by Iranian students and concomitant hostage taking of American diplomats. The embassy seizure was a turning point in the intensification of the conflict between the two discourses, escalation of enmity between the two governments, and instigation of further actions by the two governments against each other.

However, what is important is that the hostage-taking event was instrumental in the constitution of the political identity of the Islamic Republic of Iran because, despite the slogans and declarations by Imam Khomeini and Iranian religious elite about fighting hegemony or supporting the poor all across the globe, some of which were already the principles of the Islamic Republic of Iran's foreign policy, there was no clear evidence in the literature of international system about the Islamic Republic using these rare terms. Therefore, one may conclude that until the hostage-taking at the US embassy, there was no enemy to be able to stabilize and determine the political identity of the newly-formed Islamic Republic in the bipolar world. Even if the issue of enmity with the US was heard in Imam Khomeini's speeches and the people's slogans, such enmity was not reflected sufficiently as Iran and the US had not severed diplomatic ties and were running embassies at respective capitals.

Such circumstances had shrouded the Iranian religious elite's messages addressed to world leaders and people in ambiguity because many world leaders considered them as mere rhetoric that could not be turned into practice. That may explain why the US government was caught off the guard during the embassy takeover. Therefore, the embassy seizure is the most serious practical step on the part of the Islamic Republic of Iran, which resulted in the constitution of a political identity for the Islamic Republic of Iran and explains the most important reason for Imam Khomeini's endorsement of the embassy takeover as the second revolution. Further evidence is provided in the remarks by Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, a core member of the Revolution Council who went on to become the first speaker of the Islamic Consultative Assembly. Several months after the takeover of the embassy, Hashemi Rafsanjani described it as an anti-imperialistic and anti-hegemony gesture. He said: "Until before the hostage-taking issue, we had a principle for fighting hegemony, but we lacked any line and [evidence] for that principle. The hostage-taking issue made clear our anti-imperialistic and anti-hegemony line" (Documentary, IRIB, February 2008).

The US embassy takeover proved to governments and people across the globe that Imam Khomeini's resistance and steadfastness against the US and other superpowers was not limited to a slogan. In an interview with the Times of London, the imam said: "We want to show to the entire world that even dominant powers may be defeated with faith. We resist the all-powerful US government and fear no power…We know the US pretty well and we know that we can resist it to defend our honor. We have to overcome the US and defeat it in the entire region. We will not bow to injustice, nor will we compromise with oppressors…We can simply stand against US aggression. The US may defeat us, but not our revolution. That is why I believe in our own victory."

The embassy incident triggered a harsh reaction from the US. In response, the US government continued its domineering actions against Iran, provided sanctuary to the deposed Shah[6], organized a botched military attempt to secure the release of hostages, engineered an abortive military coup, instigated Iraq to invade Iran while providing the Saddam Hussein regime with military support, cut diplomatic ties, imposed economic sanctions, downed Iran's civilian plane, launched strikes on Iran's oil terminals, offered support to Iranian subversive groups, made efforts to isolate Iran internationally, and bracketed Iran into the axis of evil. Four decades on, there is still tension and hostility between the Iranian and the US governments (although there have been difficulties). The significant point is that the US's practical actions against Iran have further bolstered the Islamic Republic of Iran's political identity against an enemy like the US.

 

4. Conclusion

The Islamic Republic of Iran's resistance and perseverance against US pressure and the Islamic Republic's practical steps and stances against US interests over the past four decades, which are rooted in religious discourse and the historical background of Iran-US naked enmity, have shaped an identity for the Islamic Republic of Iran. Any renouncement of or change in the procedures and routines of the two governments against each other could disturb their political identity and bring about ontological insecurity. Furthermore, the flexibility of routines and procedures depend on the structure of the dominant discourse.

Despite the changeable nature of discourses over the course of time and under different circumstances, the dominant discourse in the foreign policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran, as well as the issue of its ties with the US, stems from the statements of a spiritual leader as well as religious precepts and values. Therefore, it is more durable and much more resistant than other discourses, particularly those whose constitutive elements are material, because of the ideological nature of the Islamic Republic's discourse. Any attempt for the disavowal of such discourse would give rise to conflicts of ideology.

For this reason, any change in the Iranian officials' stance vis-à-vis the issue of ties with the US or adoption of a crystal clear position against the US officials' offer for ties is a strategic issue because first, it can bring about an ambiguous atmosphere for the Islamic Republic of Iran’s foreign policy and its constructed identity that would be uncertain and unreliable, and second, it can undermine Iran in the eyes of revolutionary and struggling movements and anti-US governments. Both of these factors may give rise to identity insecurity for the Islamic Republic of Iran.

However, the issue, which has added to the complexity of management of the Iran-US, ties for the Islamic Republic of Iran and which highlights the necessity of reasonable management is the Islamic establishment’s potentiality of resistance and perseverance against pressures. Such complexity and finding a solution require further in-depth study and research. To express this complicated and paradoxical issue in clearer terms, it may be useful to note that President Donald Trump’s Iran policy has been of greater help than his predecessors Barack Obama’s in consolidating the political identity of the Islamic Republic of Iran and the survival of its discourse.

 

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